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Abstract: Due to advanced technological developments, mobile phone and other wireless device 
usage is increasing rapidly. The contents of the multimedia messages may be very important and 
confidential. Such confidentiality needs to be protected. Any interference and/or interceptions in 
the communication process would bring reduced system usage and disgruntled stakeholders. This 
paper discusses the several aspects of security of The Global System for Mobile communication or 
Group Special Mobile (GSM). In addition it examines how GSM protects the data from 
interception by authentication, encryption, and ciphering. It furthermore considers some likely 
flaws in these security methods and suggests possible measures to curb the flaws. 
 
1. Introduction:  
 
In most cases, connecting to other devices 
in a mobile environment requires wireless 
networks. Mobile computing has 
contributed to an increase in productivity 
and operational efficiency on individuals 
and businesses. However, the flexibility 
and ubiquity of such a system comes at a 
price – that of security. 
Security is a major concern for any 
wireless network. Since radio signals 
travel through open space, they can be 
intercepted by individuals with the right 
equipments, who are constantly on the 
move, which makes them untraceable. 
Hackers are scanning airwaves and 
siphoning off cellular ID numbers for 
improper use. The security of a mobile 
network such as GSM includes multiple 
technologies that attempt to resolve 
authentication, integrity and identification 
problems. Some of these are firewalls, 
authentication servers, biometrics, 
cryptography, intrusion detection, virus 
protection and Virtual Private Networks. 
The GSM platform which was formed in 
1982 [1] is a hugely successful wireless 
technology. Some research showed that at 
the end of Jan 2004 [2] there were over 1 
billion GSM subscribers across more than 
200 countries. Today the world-wide 
figures are even more, especially in Africa, 
Asia and other advancing economies 
where mobile communication uptake has 
increased by approximately 65% [17, 18].  
In the older analogue-based cellular 
telephone systems such as the Advanced 
Mobile Phone System (AMPS) and the 
Total Access Communication System 
(TACS) [3], cellular drop rate, interference 
and interception rate and general fraud on 
such systems were extensive and very 
rampant. Mostly, without any encryption 
[4], the voice and user data of the 
subscriber was in pure raw form and sent 
over the networks. SIM card cloning too 
was very easy and they together posed 
dangerous threat to the users. Such fatal 
flaws in the mobile phone and wireless 
technologies were all prevalent [5]. This 
led to development of GSM.  
The prevalence of GSM technologies, 
together with the introduction of 
multimedia content delivery, provides a 
stable, continuous, private and secure 
environment for communication – audio, 
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SMS, MMS services - through GSM 
network systems [18]. But how safe and 
secure is the GSM technology? Can it 
really protect vitally important 
information? In this paper we will provide 
a brief overview of GSM, its security and 
encryption technologies. Furthermore, we 
will attempt to provide a model for GSM 
security optimization. The third section 
will look at some GSM flaws and provide 
possible measures to overcome them. The 
final section gives an evaluative critique 
and conclusion to this paper. 
 
2. Encrypting GSM for security 
 
All cellular communication operates using 
air waves which can fairly easily be 
intercepted with readily available suitable 
eavesdropping receivers. Considering this 
issue, the GSM technology integrated 
some security controls [6] in order to make 
the cellular system as secure as a fixed line 
phone. The system offers some level of 
physical security such that physical access 
is needed to the phone line for listening in 
to be possible. This kind of control 
measures provides better security for 
conversation between two mobile phone 
users. According to GSM specification 
02.09 [6], the security functions put in 
place are: authentication of a user, data and 
signalling confidentiality and 
Confidentiality of a user.  
Authentication of a user means that a 
mobile phone needs to prove that it has 
access to a particular network account with 
the operator. Data and signalling 
confidentiality is to make sure that all 
signalling and user data, such as text 
messaging and speech are protected 
against interception by means of ciphering. 
Meanwhile confidentiality of a user 
function keeps the unique International 
Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) and 
prevents it from being disclosed and 
displayed in plaintext to avoid leaving 
tracks of the user. It also means that 
intruders cannot easily track down certain 
subscriber of the GSM system.  
Besides some of the above security 
functions, there are other functions that 
prove to make the mobile phone more 
secured. The most commonly known 
protective system is that of the PIN which 
GSM system provides. In order to 
distribute the authentication and ciphering 
information throughout the network, the 
root key of all ciphering key generation 
and authentication, Ki [4] have to be 
distributed by another form known as 
vectors. This too adds another security 
level in our proposed security model as 
would be highlighted below and aims to 
improve the GSM security. 
In managing mobile access to network 
system resources, it is very essential to 
enforce security measures. The system 
should be able to know who is accessing 
resources at what point and know the 
purpose of each access. Controlling access 
to systems is best illustrated in the AAA 
framework: Authentication, Authorisation 
and Accounting [20, 21]. Authentication is 
the ability to identify network or system 
users through the validation of a set of 
assigned credentials such as user 
identification number and passwords. 
Authorisation defines the ability of a 
specific user to perform certain tasks, such 
as creating, modifying and deleting, after 
authentication has taken place. And, 
Accounting allows it to measure and 
record the consumption of network or 
system resources. This framework adapts 
well in a mobile or wireless environment. 
The most challenging amongst the three 
issues in the AAA framework is 
authentication. The increased complexity 
of attacks has pushed the network society 
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to build up strong authentication 
techniques. Rather than only relying on the 
inadequate use of usernames and 
passwords, different and efficient 
technologies have been developed for 
improve security, such as RADIUS 
(Remote Authentication Dial up User 
Service), Token-based Strong 
authentication, 802.11i Security, Secure 
Socket Layer (SSL), Virtual Private 
Networks (VPN) and Media Access 
Control (MAC) Filtering. In most 
Instances, GSM networks utilises 
encryption for three purposes: 
authentication, encryption and key 
generation [7]. 
 
Figure 1. Proposed Model for improve GSM Security 
 
2.1. Authentication: 
 
Authentication service within a system is 
concerned with assuring that a 
communication is authentic. It can prohibit 
an unauthorized user claiming to be a 
bonafide mobile subscriber logging into 
the network [6]. In order to ascertain the 
position, some kind of challenge needs to 
be issued by the network, for which the 
mobile station (MS) such as mobile phone, 
must respond to correctly. And if all fails, 
the unauthorized user therefore fails to 
personate the bonafide subscriber because 
of the challenge provided in connecting to 
the network. Others techniques include 
such as the SIM card, A3 Algorithm IMSI 
and Ki. 
The Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) 
card is a small smartcard with embedded 
micro-chip which is inserted into the GSM 
phone and provides the appropriate details 
of an account. The SIM card contains 
information which is necessary to gain 
access to a particular account. Some of 
which are: International Mobile Subscriber 
Identity (IMSI), and Individual Subscriber 
Authentication Key (Ki) etc. The IMSI is a 
sequence of 15-digit code, used to identify 
an individual GSM mobile station (MS) to 
a GSM network [9]. 
Ki is utilised as a highly protected secret 
key shared between the MS and the Home 
Location Register (HLR) of the 
subscriber's home network [10]. It is a 
randomly generated 128-bit number and all 
keys and challenges used in the GSM 
system are generated according to Ki. Also 
used in authentication is the A3 algorithm 
[6]. In this procedure, two 128-bit input 
GSM 
Authentication 
Anonymity Ciphering 
Vectors PIN 
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codes are calculated by A3 algorithm and 
then a 32-bit output code is generated. The 
most common implementations for A3 are 
COMP128. The authentication procedure 
can simply be described as: mobile phone 
provides the Ki to network and the latter 
could verify the Ki to prove the mobile 
phone is not the impersonated one. But, 
this is highly insecure because the Ki could 
be intercepted by an eavesdropper. If Ki is 
lost, the authentication will disappear 
because the eavesdropper will personate 
that subscriber by providing the same Ki.  
In such situations, the GSM technology 
provides a better method to resolve such a 
problem. The network generates a 128-bit 
random number, RAND [10] which is 128-
bit random challenge generated by the 
Home Location Register (HLR). It then 
uses the A3 algorithm to generate an 
authentication sign, SRES [10] which is 
the 32-bit Signed Response (SRES) 
generated by the MS and the Mobile 
Services Switching Center. After the 
generation of SRES, the network then 
sends the RAND to the phone. The phone 
respond by doing the same, generating a 
32-bit SRES and then transmitting the 
SRES back to the network for comparison. 
Authentication is complete and becomes 
successful only when the two values of 
SRES are the same. This enables the 
subscriber to then join the network. If 
authentication fails the first time, the 
network may choose to repeat the 
authentication procedure with the IMSI. If 
that too fails, the network releases the 
radio connection. The mobile then 
considers that SIM to be invalid. 
Therefore, the protection of Ki is provided. 
And just in case an eavesdropper manages 
to intercept the RAND, no relevant 
information can be retrieved by listening to 
the channel because, each time, a new 
RAND number is generated. 
2.2. Ciphering: 
 
It is vitally important that providers keep 
user data and signaling data secure from 
interception by ciphering. The GSM 
system uses symmetric cryptography. In 
symmetric cryptography, the data is 
encrypted using an algorithm and the 
ciphering key. In GSM systems, the 
ciphering key is named Kc. Kc is the 64-
bit ciphering key [10] and used as a 
Session Key for encryption of the air 
channel. Kc is generated by the MS from 
the RAND presented by the GSM network 
and the Ki from the SIM utilising the A8 
algorithm. Like symmetric cryptography, 
this same Kc is needed by the decryption 
algorithm to decrypt the data. The idea is 
that the Kc should only be known by the 
phone and the network. If this is the case, 
the data is meaningless to anyone 
intercepting it. As earlier mentioned, the 
A8 algorithm uses the RAND and Ki as 
input to generate a 64-bit ciphering key Kc 
which is then stored in the SIM and 
readable by the phone [11]. Like the 
SRES, the network also generates the Kc 
and distributes it to the base station (BTS) 
handling the connection. 
The A5 algorithm uses the 64-bit cipher 
key [12] derived from the 128-bit 
authentication key by the A8 algorithm in 
the SIM card to perform the encryption. 
The A5 algorithm is also 'seeded' by the 
value COUNT [6], which is sequentially 
applied to each 4.615ms GSM frame (see 
figure 4). Currently there are 3 algorithms 
defined for ciphering algorithms – A5/1, 
A5/2 and A5/3 [6]. A5/1 and A5/2 were 
the original algorithms defined by the 
GSM standard. A5/2 was a deliberate 
weakening of the algorithm for certain 
export regions, where A5/1 is used. In 
countries such as the US, UK and 
Australia, A5/3 was added in 2002 and is 
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based on the open Kasumi algorithm 
defined by 3GPP. The output of A5 
algorithm is the cipher text which is very 
secure and cannot be easily decrypted by 
eavesdroppers. 
 
2.3. Anonymity: 
 
Anonymity is a process set to make it 
difficult to track a mobile phone user of 
the system. According to Srinivas [13], 
when a new GSM subscriber switches on 
their phone for the first time, its 
International Mobile Subscriber Identity 
(IMSI), for example real identity, is used 
and a Temporary Mobile Subscriber 
Identity (TMSI) is issued to the subscriber, 
which from then on is always used. Once 
ciphering has commenced the initial TMSI 
is allocated. The VLR controlling the LA 
in which the TMSI is valid maintains a 
mapping between the TMSI and IMSI such 
that, the new VLR (if the MS moves into a 
new VLR area) can ask the old VLR who 
the TMSI (which is not valid in the new 
VLR) belongs to [6]. The use of TMSI 
prevents the recognition of a GSM user by 
the potential eavesdropper. To track a 
GSM user via the TMSI, an eavesdropper 
must intercept the GSM network 
communication where the TMSI was 
initially negotiated. In addition, because 
the TMSI is frequently changed, the 
eavesdropper must intercept each 
additional TMSI changing session. 
The TMSI is updated at least during every 
location update procedure such as when 
the phone changes location area (LA) or 
after a set period of time. The TMSI can 
also be changed at any time by the 
network. The new TMSI is sent in 
ciphered mode whenever possible so an 
attacker cannot maintain a mapping 
between an old TMSI and a new one [6]. 
The TMSI is valid in the location area in 
which it was issued. For communications 
outside the location area, the Location 
Area Identification (LAI) [14] is necessary 
in addition to the TMSI 
 
2.4. Authentication vectors: 
 
In the GSM communications, the AuC 
(Authentication Centre), which is a part of 
HLR (Home Location Register), as it is 
well known, stores the SRES, Kc and 
RAND for every particular subscriber. 
And if the subscriber is roaming, the 
foreign GSM database known as VLR 
(Visitor Location Register) would learn 
and source the Ki from HLR [13]. This 
process is very insecure because the Ki 
transfers directly from HLR to VLR and 
can be intercepted. However, the HLR 
distributes authentication vectors [6], 
including a valid SRES, Kc and RAND for 
the particular IMSI, which the VLR has 
specified. So therefore, the transmitted 
data are not Kis but other authentication 
and ciphering information, and given 
protection to the Ki. 
 
2.5. SIM card security: 
 
Most often, the SIM itself is protected by 
an optional PIN code which resembles that 
of an ATM PIN card system [8]. Typically 
if a user inputs the wrong PIN code three 
(3) times, the system will automatically 
lock out and block the user from using the 
system again. In such instance, a PIN 
Unlock called PUK is required to unlock 
the system before any use, if the PUK is 
correct. And incorrectly entering the PUK 
code 10 times, the SIM card would be 
permanently blocked and refusing local 
access to privileged information making 
the SIM useless. 
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3. Systems vulnerabilities and 
Solutions: 
 
Some of the security algorithms discussed 
above tend to provide the GSM system 
with some security, and it may seems that 
such a GSM system is protected 
absolutely. However with such 
technologies commonly available, the 
systems in turn become vulnerable and 
complicated and as such, the more people 
begin to find flaws in the GSM security. 
Recently, some of these flaws are 
gradually been resolved by specialists in 
line with the improved GSM 
specifications. Other new technologies 
such as GSM 1800, HSCSD, GPRS and 
EDGE have been added to enhance GSM 
system [3]. And, the 3rd generation (3G) 
technologies such as UMTS [6] have also 
been used to improve the security in GSM. 
The next section will explore some of the 
network security issues. 
 
3.1. Security in UMTS technology: 
 
In the GSM network systems, it is 
unbelievable that the authentication 
procedure does not require the network to 
prove its knowledge of the Ki or any other 
authentication context to the mobile phone. 
Therefore, it is possible for an attacker to 
setup an impersonated mobile base station 
with the same Mobile Network Code as the 
user's network. And with this, all calls or 
text messages sent by the subscriber could 
easily be intercepted. 
The Universal Mobile 
Telecommunications System (UMTS) is 
the world's choice for 3rd Generation 
wireless service delivery [15], as defined 
by the International Telecommunications 
Union (ITU). With the UMTS technology, 
it is near impossible for an attacker to 
mimic or imitate the network in terms of a 
2-way authentication procedure. The 
procedure for which the mobile 
authenticates itself to the network is almost 
the same as GSM. But in UMTS, the 
network also sends an Authentication 
Token known as AUTN along with the 
RAND. The AUTN contains the MAC 
code, which works much like the GSM 
SRES but in the opposite direction. 
Therefore, if the MAC sent by the network 
does not match the MAC calculated by the 
SIM, the phone respond by sending an 
authentication reject message to the 
network and the connection is then 
terminated. 
 
3.2. Enhancing implementation of 
A3/A8 Algorithms: 
 
As earlier discussed, the common 
implementation of the A3 and A8 
algorithms is concerned with a single 
algorithm - COMP128; which generates 
the 64-bit Kc and the 32-bit SRES from 
the 128-bit RAND and the 128-bit Ki 
input. This algorithm has been found to be 
insecure, because, as it is, the RANDs can 
provide enough information for an attacker 
to determine the Ki in significantly less 
than the ideal number of attempts. Earlier 
attacks based on repeated 2R attacks [6] 
could typically crack a SIM in 
approximately 217 RANDs. Increasingly, 
and even more so, some users have found 
it useful to 'clone' several of their SIMs 
[16] onto a single programmable smartcard 
with easily available technology. 
The common implementation of A3/A8, 
COMP128 has another flaw, in that, when 
generating the 64-bit Kc, it always sets the 
least significant 10 bits of the Kc to 0 [3] 
this is almost certainly a deliberate 
weakening. This effectively reduces the 
strength of the data ciphering algorithm to 
54 bits, regardless of which ciphering 
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algorithm is used. Therefore, faced with 
the above insecurity, the newer 
implementations of A3/A8 have been 
introduced such as COMP128-2 and 
COMP128-3 [6] to help alleviate the 
problems. So far, these algorithms have 
held up reasonably well, however, they are 
still a mystery as they are developed in 
secret. COMP128-2 still has the deliberate 
10-bit weakening of the ciphering Kc 
however. COMP128-3 is the same basic 
algorithm without this weakening, such as 
a truly 64-bit Kc. In fact, the new 
algorithms of COMP128-2 and 
COMP128-3 have managed to stop SIM 
cloning somehow and have also made the 
serious over-the-air Ki extraction difficult 
and unfeasible, even if they do not 
approach the ideal strength of 2128. 
 
3.3. Exploring A5/3, A5/1 and A5/2 
algorithms: 
 
The A5/1 output is based on the modulo-2 
which is performed using an exclusive OR 
known as xor operation summed output of 
3 LFSRs whose clock inputs are controlled 
by a majority function of certain bits in 
each LFSR. However, the attack exploits 
flaws [15] in the algorithm and A5/1 could 
be cracked in less than 1 second on a 
typical PC. A5/2 is a deliberately 
weakened version of A5/1, which has been 
demonstrated to be also flawed. A5/2 can 
be cracked on the order of about 216, and 
thus is even weaker than A5/1. GSM 
supports up to 7 different algorithms for 
A5 ciphering. Until recently, only the A5/1 
and A5/2 algorithms were used. In 2002, 
GSM added a much stronger algorithm 
A5/3 which is based on the Kasumi core 
which is the core encryption algorithm for 
UMTS [6]. However, only few networks 
and handsets support this algorithm 
currently. 
4. Conclusions: 
 
Although new measures by which the 
security of GSM is protected are 
introduced, with time, hackers may still 
find ways around these measures. There 
can be no perfectly secure product, but one 
can say that GSM is the most secure, 
globally accepted wireless system, with 
public standard to date. It can be made 
more secured by taking appropriate 
security measures in certain areas of 
system management. Adequate 
management of identities in open systems 
networks is crucial to provide security and 
improve efficiency. Identity management 
requires an integrated and often complex 
infrastructure where all involved parties 
must be trusted for specific purposes 
depending on their role and function. In 
this paper, many algorithms have been 
implored to demonstrate that the 
mechanisms of security in the GSM 
specification maintain some level of 
security in the cellular telecommunications 
system. The measures used in the GSM 
such as authentication, ciphering and 
anonymity give the mobile phone users 
some privacy and anonymity, in addition 
to protecting the system from the 
fraudulent use. However, we have also 
seen some weaknesses in the security of 
GSM. There are flaws such as in 
COMP128, A5/1 and so on. These 
vulnerabilities could be used by attacker to 
intercept the contents of conversations or 
text messages. Some measures have also 
been explored to prevent these flaws to an 
extent and imploring new technologies 
such as UMTS and others improved 
algorithm to take care of the weakness in 
security of GSM. 
Furthermore, with increase developments 
in the GSM technologies, it is very likely 
that, more secure methods will be 
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developed and used in 3G and 4G mobile 
network environments to give it added 
security. 
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